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Theme: The relationship between China and Africa is positive for both sides and the 
exchange of essential natural resources for infrastructure to foster economic development 
is more likely to benefit than paternalistic and failed aid strategies. 
 
 
Summary: China’s rapidly growing demand for energy and natural resources has created 
increasingly important strategic partnerships with African nations. Blessed with a strong 
endowment of mineral fuels and ores, Sub-Saharan nations are benefitting from Chinese 
demand that has driven commodity prices up and generated billions in infrastructure 
investment on the continent. While some believe China’s entry into Africa is simply 
another neo-colonial effort with a clear disregard for human rights and the legitimacy of 
governments, many believe China’s pragmatic and businesslike approach is more 
dynamic and well rounded than classic Western aid efforts. Not only are Chinese 
investments inherently different in their goals and strategy, but they are also significantly 
larger. There is no doubt that China will continue to need Africa for years, as its paradox 
of abundant human capital and scarce natural resources will make Africa a key partner in 
fuelling the double-digit growth rates needed to maintain political stability. It is the opinion 
of this paper that the relationship between China and Africa is positive for both sides. 
China is providing African nations with a tremendous opportunity and has made them 
relevant again to global policymakers, but it is up to Africa to capitalise and drive a hard 





Divergent Paths Come Together 
The story of Sub-Saharan Africa and China over the past 30 years has been one of 
completely divergent paths. China has been hailed by many as a sort of economic 
miracle, what Fareed Zakaria has described as compressing the West’s 230 years of 
industrialisation into 30. The Chinese economy between 1979 and 2008 grew at an 
average annual rate of 9.9% and according to the Economist Intelligence Unit is poised to 
overtake the US as the world’s largest economy by 2020, with a GDP on a PPP basis of 
US$26 trillion. Compared to 1974, when it represented 2% of world GDP, China now 
represents 11% of world GDP and is a driver of global growth. In 2009 alone, China 
contributed 25% to all economic growth worldwide. In the process, China has lifted more 
than 400 million people out of poverty, surpassed Germany as the world’s leading 
exporter and accumulated over US$2.5 trillion in currency reserves. 
 
China still has a way to go and is still a relatively poor country on a per capita basis but it 
can without question lay claim to the greatest poverty-reduction programme the world has 
ever seen. Then there is Sub-Saharan Africa: not only has it failed to develop and achieve 
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economic take-off, but it can legitimately be argued that it has for years been a lost 
continent, left out and marginalised by the globalisation process. Sub-Saharan Africa 
represents 8.6% of the world’s population, yet only 1.2% of its GDP. 
 
The world has seemingly advanced, while Africa has stayed behind. However, regardless 
of how different their paths have been, an intriguing strategic relationship based on 
interests and mutual needs has begun to develop between China and Africa. With a 
population of over 1.2 billion and an insatiable need for natural resources and oil to fuel 
double-digit economic growth rates, China needs Africa’s resources and is actively 
seeking them. China’s role in Africa is making what once seemed a lost continent more 
relevant than ever before. Many feel China is the big investor Africa has been waiting for, 
while some feel its undemocratic nature will only aggravate Africa’s true problems of 
governance and lacklustre political institutions. This ARI seeks to look at the drivers 
pushing the growth behind the partnership between China and Africa, its criticism and why 
it might ring hollow, and the new opportunities and threats it presents Africa as it moves 
into the 21st century.1 
 
China’s Energy and Natural Resource Requirements 
Due to China’s sheer size and explosive growth, demand for commodities has risen 
astronomically, prompting a global hunt for energy. Combining industrial export-driven 
growth, along with insufficient domestic production in every area (with the exception of 
coal), Chinese commodity imports have risen exponentially. Between 2000 and 2008 
China’s consumption of key metals such as aluminium, copper, lead, nickel, tin and zinc 
grew on average by 16.1% a year. Shipments of iron ore to China have grown by more 
than 27% a year since 2004. In 2009 alone, China demanded almost 60% of the world’s 
iron ore to produce 47% of the world’s steel production, driving up huge increases in trade 
with Brazil and Australia. With a fifth of the world’s population, China consumes half of its 
cement, a third of its steel and over a quarter of its aluminium. China has become an 
absolute force in commodity markets, with an appetite for commodities that many 
describe with adjectives such as ‘voracious’ or ‘ravenous’. This is not slowing down and 
always grows faster than analysts forecast. The International Energy Agency has 
underestimated Chinese demand for imported oil and gas every year for the past five 
years. 
 
With a completely environmentally-unsustainable energy mix comprised of 69.6% coal, 
and the cost of renewables being so high that they are relatively prohibitive and 
incompatible with the administration’s economic growth targets and desire to maintain 
cost advantages; demand growth for imported oil and LNG (liquefied natural gas) is 
projected to rise significantly. What is also important is that Chinese per capita energy 
demand is three times less than Europe’s and seven to nine times less than America’s; a 
figure that simply will not stay that low. The Chinese are after wealth and improving their 
standard of living, which almost has a one-to-one correlation with energy consumption. 
China’s net oil imports are projected to rise by 13.1 million bpd by 2030, a level that would 
be comparable to the EU in that year. China’s dependence on imported oil could rise from 
the current level of about 50% to around 80% by 2030. Placed in the context of what 
some call the energy ‘trilemma’ of economic competitiveness, security of supply and 
environmental sustainability, China’s priorities are clearly guided towards the first two at 
the expense of the third. 
                                                 
1 A debate between two leading African scholars, Calestous Juma and George Ayittey, held by The 
Economist, does an excellent job outlining a local vision of the pros and cons of Chinese involvement. See 
http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/465. 
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Elizabeth C. Economy, a China policy expert at the Council of Foreign Relations, did an 
excellent job of pointing out the kinds of magnitudes China faces in the future. These 
include: 
 
• 52,700 miles of new highways. 
• 14,000 new cars hitting China’s roads each day, which equates to 130 million cars by 
2020, making China eventually the world’s largest automobile market. 
• Relocation of more than 400 million people to urban centres by 2050 (larger than the 
entire US population). 
• Half the new buildings in the entire world during 2000-30 will be built in China. 
 
If these factors are taken into account along with the fact that manufacturing represents 
about 48% of China’s GDP, it should be no surprise that demand for commodities has 
outpaced the growth of its economy. Given China’s mismatch of an abundant population 
growing in wealth with a very scarce natural resource base (per capita), this trend will 
undoubtedly continue for years to come. 
 
An Ideal Match? 
A quick look at the 2007 US Geological Survey’s Mineral Yearbook demonstrates just how 
wealthy Africa is with regard to mineral resources of all kinds. Most importantly, notice 
how prolific individually some Sub-Saharan nations are within that African share with 
regard to a particular mineral. This allows China to identify key countries with which to 
engage in bilateral negotiations, playing on the dynamic of mutual needs (aid and 




Source: the author based on the US Geological Survey’s Mineral Yearbook of 2007. 
 
China’s fuel imports from Africa rose from US$10.1 billion in 2004 to US$38.5 billion in 
2008, a 280% increase. African exports of non-fuel minerals rose from US$1.4 billion in 
2004 to US$7.2 billion in 2008, up 402.7%. In the same period, exports of precious stones 
and metals (mainly platinum and diamonds) rose from US$742 million to US$1.77 billion 
in 2008, up 138.8%. 
 
The intriguing thing about the Sino-African relationship, however, is how it has gone 
beyond simply a relationship based on trade to a boom in investment that is challenging 
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the classic development paradigms established by Western IFIs such as the IMF and 
World Bank. It is safe to say that barely a week goes by without Beijing signing a 
multimillion-dollar bilateral agreement with an African country. The results are 
everywhere, with Chinese workers building roads, ports, dams, railways, football 
stadiums, hotels and office blocks. We will now examine how the Chinese are going about 
investing in Africa and offering aid, and what the reaction is on both sides to this recent 
phenomenon. 
 
Enormous Growth of China-Africa Trade in the Past Decade 
Although Chinese trade with Africa still represents only 4% of its total (key export markets 
for Chinese products such as the US, the EU, Japan and South Korea are still king), it is 
increasing at an incredibly rapid rate. Make no bones about it: China is particularly 
targeting African nations that possess energy and raw materials. Total trade between 
China and Africa rose from roughly US$10 billion in 2000 to approximately US$107 billion 
in 2008, a tenfold increase. The key trade dynamic between China and Africa is that of 
natural resources in exchange for cheaper and more affordable Chinese products than 
those the West can offer and Africans are currently able to produce. Mineral fuels such as 
oil were by far China’s largest import from Africa, accounting for 71% of the total in 2008. 
Put together, mineral fuels, ores, precious stones and metals accounted for 87% of 
Chinese imports from Africa. As a result of this, the top five sources of African imports 
were Angola (40%), South Africa (15.5%), the Sudan (11%), the Congo (8.2%) and Libya 
(5.7%). With five important oil and mineral suppliers accounting for 80% of total imports, 
the trend for the remaining 20% remains the same. Other key suppliers to China on a 
smaller scale include Gabon (oil & minerals), Equatorial Guinea (oil) and Zambia (copper). 
 
Surprisingly, China actually exported more to Africa than it imported from the continent. In 
2008 Chinese exports to Africa were valued at US$50.87 billion while imports from Africa 
were only US$45.67 billion. Nonetheless, the top five export markets are still metals and 
energy suppliers to China, with South Africa, Nigeria and Angola receiving 35% of 
Chinese exports to Africa. The rest is scattered around the continent just about anywhere 
the Chinese can place their products. Price-sensitive markets in Africa have welcomed 
the easy availability of low-priced Chinese goods. There is, however, a cautionary tale to 
be told as Africa must be vigilant to ensure Chinese products do not flood the market and 
overwhelm any chance of beginning domestic African production in non-natural resource 
sectors. 
 
The Chinese Aid Strategy: Resource Backed Loans and Infrastructure 
In a column for Foreign Affairs, titled ‘Africa’s Eastern Promise’, Deborah Brautigam wrote 
that the inspiration for China’s aid strategy in Africa came from its own experiences. In the 
70s, as China desperately sought modern technology and infrastructure without foreign 
exchange to use as capital, it leveraged on its natural resources. Using oil and coal, China 
directly swapped those goods for a US$10 billion loan from Japan, a practice that China 
uses today in Africa through its resource-backed loans. As a result, in 1980 the money 
from Japan’s loan went to building railways, ports and hydropower projects, helping 
develop transport systems, coal mines and power grids. 
 
China understands its ability to influence in this capacity due to what it means to nations 
attempting to emerge from poverty or conflict. When the Congo announced that the 
Chinese would spend US$12 billion to build railways, roads and mines in exchange for 
copper ore of equal value, that sum was more than three times the Congo’s annual 
national budget and roughly 10 times the aid promised by all Western donors combined. 
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China’s broad strategy is to lend at deeply concessional terms in order to finance specific 
infrastructure projects in exchange for –or backed by– African natural resources. 
 
As regards the Specifics, the first question involves the numbers: how much aid is going 
to Africa and how fast is it growing? 
 
Chinese aid to Africa has grown from only US$10 million in 2002 to US$17.9 billion in 
2007, an enormous increase. There is no sign of this slowing down, as Chinese premier 
Wen Jiabao recently pledged US$10 billion in new low-cost loans between 2010 and 2012 
last November at the China-Africa summit in Egypt. The loan pledge doubled the 
commitment made in 2006 and came at a summit at which delegates from both sides 
stressed that their ties go beyond the Chinese acquisition of raw materials. With US$2.5 
trillion in currency reserves, China has such a cash-rich position that it is certainly not 
short of funds if Africa wants or needs more. 
 
Secondly, what kinds of projects is China financing and where are the funds going? 
Primarily, funds are being directed at projects for infrastructure for key suppliers of oil and 
minerals. According to an NYU Wagner School research team, a compiled list of Chinese-
funded African infrastructure projects yielded a breakdown of 54% to public works 
projects, 28.5% to the extraction or production of natural resources and 2.5% to 
humanitarian activities, with the remaining 15% unspecified. The intentions are clear, and 
the Chinese have no intention of hiding that. Recently, China agreed to spend up to 
US$23 billion to build oil refineries and other petroleum infrastructure in Nigeria in order to 
potentially strengthen its hand in the country as it seeks to secure 6 billion barrels of crude 
reserves. Analysing a group of African natural-resource suppliers to China which received 
over US$24 billion in aid and investment between 2002 and 2007, the kinds of projects 
included are as follows: infrastructure, mining, oil refining, hydropower, dam construction, 
national stadiums, telecommunications, electricity, medical training, universities and 
administrative buildings.2 
 
Third, what kinds of loans and terms are the Chinese providing? China’s Eximbank offers 
loans at highly-competitive interest rates, ranging from LIBOR plus 1.25% to LIBOR plus 
1.75%, as well as extremely generous grace periods and longer repayment terms. Donald 
Kaberuka, Chairman of the African Development Bank, has said that the Chinese take a 
much longer-term perspective on a country’s ability to repay debts. They also allow the 
countries to repay debt directly with natural resources or oil, something previously 
unheard of with Western aid and commercial lenders. In addition, the Chinese forgive 
debts and reduce commercial barriers in the process, making low-cost loans part of a total 
economic effort. The fact that most loans are issued at market rates means they do not 
qualify as foreign aid. However, this may be a good thing. As Deborah Brautigam points 
out, ‘In poor, resource-rich countries, which are often cursed rather than blessed by their 
mineral wealth, resource backed infrastructure loans can act as an agency of restraint, 
ensuring that at least some of these countries natural resource wealth is spent on 
development investments’. 
 
There are certainly other loan conditions that worry some observers. One area many are 
concerned about is Chinese firms and workers getting the lion’s share of the workload, 
basically providing money but leaving many African workers out of the construction 
                                                 
2 This group of countries includes Angola, The Democratic Republic of Congo, the Sudan, Gabon, 
Mozambique and Equatorial Guinea, which export oil, minerals, wood and ores to China. 
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process, hurting employment opportunities and technology transfers. This has been an 
issue, but African nations are beginning to drive a harder bargain. In the Congo, for 
instance, the government has stipulated that 10% to 12% of all the infrastructure work 
undertaken must be subcontracted to Congolese firms, that no more than 20% of the 
construction workers involved be Chinese and that at least one-half of 1% of the costs of 
each infrastructure project be spent on worker training. 
 
Fourth, the key difference with IMF and World Bank aid is the lack of conditionality with 
regard to political and economic reforms attached to the loans. Unlike the IMF and the 
World Bank, the Chinese do not factor in human rights, democracy or economic reforms 
when doing business with or lending to African nations. This has come under heavy 
criticism, as the Chinese conduct heavy business activity in places like the Sudan and 
other pariah states. Some believe this will impede the spread of strong democratic and 
effective political institutions that will ensure all of this Chinese money ends up being 
reinvested and not in Swiss bank accounts. 
 
Western Hypocrisy and Challenging Classic Development Paradigms? 
Not all observers believe that China’s whatever-it-takes hunt for commodities is really in 
Africa’s interest. The most frequent critique is of China’s foreign policy of dealing with 
undemocratic and highly oppressive regimes. In its drive to secure supplies of natural 
resources, many accuse China of supporting dictators and undermining Western efforts to 
spread democracy and prosperity. The US and European countries believe that a Chinese 
take-over in Africa would erode all possibilities of Western values and the concern for 
human rights from flourishing on the continent. After all, part of Africa’s failure has been 
the lack of quality leadership and effective political institutions. 
 
Primarily, one can point to China’s continued extraction of oil in the Sudan and its loans to 
a number of repressive dictatorships. That said, some of the countries doing the 
criticising, most notably the US and France, have supported dictators and financed 
conflicts when it has clearly been in their interest. This is part of why China’s message 
and strategy resonates so strongly with many African nations and leaders, the appeal of 
their principle of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states. One can safely say 
that the behaviour of the Western powers on the African continent has been two-faced 
and hypocritical, as they have supported regimes just as corrupt if not more than those 
they accuse China of supporting. It is a fact that Western governments and multinationals 
have propped up dictators, financed conflicts, turned a blind eye to genocide and 
knowingly gone about business practices that used militias and child soldiers as a means 
to extract natural resources. 
 
The main argument against China in Africa is that by aiding internationally-ostracised 
regimes, corruption, economic mismanagement and instability will proliferate. Some 
believe that if Chinese influence spreads too widely, the ‘Washington Consensus’ of 
economic liberalism and democracy will find itself in competition with a ‘Beijing 
Consensus’ of state-led development and disregard for human rights. 
 
But from strictly an objective economic and poverty-reduction perspective, is emulating 
China inherently a bad thing? 
 
It is interesting that the overwhelming majority of the economic take-off and development 
success stories in the 20th century have occurred with heterodox economic policies that 
have ignored many of the West’s recommendations and used very little aid. As Dani 
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Rodrik, a notable Harvard economist, has pointed out: most poor countries that have 
made progress have done so crafting their own economic policy through gradual 
experiential learning and by possessing the autonomy to do what they feel is best. It may 
be controversial, but would China have been better off applying a ‘one size fits all’ World 
Bank structural adjustment programme in 1978 instead of its own unorthodox gradual 
approach as implemented by Deng Xiaoping? 
 
A list of countries including China, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
India, Japan and even Chile have broken just about every rule in the book. All have at 
some point subsidised exports, directed credit, infringed on copyrights, placed domestic 
content requirements on local production, used tariff and non-tariff barriers, public 
ownership of large segments of banking and industry and restricted capital flows. Most of 
these countries have been much more successful than Sub-Saharan Africa in developing 
their economies. Perhaps what is most important, and what intrigues African policymakers 
about China, is that it can provide a personal level of expertise that Western experts 
cannot. William Easterly, a development economist and author of The White Man’s 
Burden, pointed out very interestingly that development experts are greatly overrated as a 
means to achieve development. Remarkably, that statement challenges his own interest 
as a member of the profession who has dedicated years to the cause. This may be true 
and revealing, as Easterly goes further and points out that, unlike China, development 
experts from developed countries have never actually developed any of their own nations 
and perhaps even hurt developing nations more than they have helped. Easterly’s 
comments question an entire establishment and industry, but are worthy of reflection. 
 
In contrast to the Washington Consensus, the Chinese model rejects shock therapy and 
the big bang in favour of a process of gradual reform based on working through existing 
institutions. It involves a process of selective learning, or cultural borrowing and drawing 
on foreign ideas, including the neo-liberal American model, as well as many that are 
home-grown. 
 
The key question African policymakers are asking themselves is which is better; Chinese 
pragmatism and experience or Western ideology? The consequences of following a 
Chinese or Asian philosophy of economic growth only time will tell, but given the results in 
development, can you blame Africa for looking East for ideas? 
 
The Opportunities and Concerns 
To come full circle, the following is a list of 10 potentially positive aspects for Africa that 
come simply as a result of China’s increased presence on the continent: 
 
(1) Competition over African resources, allowing Africans more leverage and say in 
the negotiation process and to haggle for terms. China’s arrival as an alternative 
source of trade, aid and investment has created a competitive environment where 
African states are no longer exclusively dependent on Western nations. 
(2) China has driven up both demand and prices for global commodities, making the 
supply of natural resources more lucrative than ever before. 
(3) China can offer its own experience of growth as an example and model for other 
developing countries to consider and learn from, something the US, as the doyen 
of developed countries, cannot. 
(4) Cheaper and more affordable Chinese goods for African consumers. 
(5) US$2.5 trillion in currency reserves available for financing needs. The IMF 
possesses US$257 billion in usable resources, while China has US$2.5 trillion in 
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currency reserves. That makes Chinese currency reserves roughly 10 times bigger 
than all the funds at the IMF’s disposal. 
(6) Better terms and more flexibility regarding aid financing. 
(7) The creation of special economic zones across the continent as a means of 
boosting non-natural resource industries and trade. The building of special trade 
and economic cooperation zones focusing on boosting manufactured exports can 
help overcome the Dutch disease. 
(8) Money for infrastructure, infrastructure and more infrastructure. Especially in 
countries that have been ravaged by conflict such as Angola and the Congo, this 
is absolutely key to getting their economies back on track. Since infrastructure 
requires such large investments, it typically needs to come from sources outside 
Africa. 
(9) Shifting of some labour- and energy-intensive industries to Africa as Chinese firms 
move up the value chain. This could be a potential solution to reducing the 
dependency on extractive industries and revenues from natural-resource exports. 
Robert Zoellick, President of the World Bank, is on record telling the Financial 
Times that China is interested in helping to create low-cost manufacturing bases in 
Africa. 
(10) Finally, and unquestionably most important, Africa is relevant again on the 
global stage as everybody seems to be talking about it a lot more since China has 
been around. 
 
There are, however, some precautions that should be borne in mind in what seems to be 
a match made in heaven, of which the five most important are: 
 
(1) Chinese deals should not exclude African workers and firms from the bulk of the 
work in large projects by bringing their own workforces from China. This idea also 
applies to African firms getting a share in development contracts. 
(2) Cheap Chinese products should not flood African markets, putting local African 
products at a huge disadvantage, further hampering the diversification away from 
natural-resource sectors into textiles or manufacturing. 
(3) There should not be a disparity in the size of the trading partners, potentially 
allowing China to dominate the relationship and impose terms. 
(4) The Dutch Disease and over-dependence on natural-resource exports should be 
avoided. 
(5) The failure to improve governance and political institutions will prevent the money 




It is Ultimately up to Africans to Emerge as Winners 
While the effects of China’s venture into Africa will only be known with time, the author 
believes that the relationship between China and Africa is positive for both sides. The 
exchange of essential needs such as natural resources and infrastructure to sustain or 
foster economic development is much more likely to achieve great things than 
paternalistic and failed aid strategies. As the Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo has 
pointed out, ‘China’s African role is wider, more sophisticated and more businesslike than 
any other country’s at any time in the post-war period’. It is time for Africa to realise what it 
is worth to China and the world, to unify and to re-invest prudently in its people and in 
developing its human capital. The Chinese economy must grow enormously every year in 
order to maintain political stability, and that cannot happen without the massive quantities 
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of natural resources it needs. The Chinese ‘supercycle’ of 10% annual growth will drive 
commodity imports up by even larger percentages. The money and cooperation are there 
with China, but it is up to Africa to come out gaining from the relationship. Africa should 
not be afraid of requiring that African workers and firms get jobs and contracts, that safety 
and quality standards are upheld, and that its economies diversify away from simply 
producing primary products. 
 
Patricio González Richardson 
Researcher in International Political Economy 
 
